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Imagine you are standing in an art museum, mesmerized by an enormous 
canvas of turbulent paint.  Though you find no recognizable images, you are 
fascinated by the swirling movements of rich azures and cobalt blues. Your eyes 
follow the artist’s long, energetic brush strokes across the work, and you feel a 
sense of motion inside your body.  Suddenly, your attention is caught by a small 
area of densely applied paint—a deep crimson.  You linger.  The thick color 
glows.  As your awareness of the surroundings dim, the bright spot on the 
canvas expands, and the sensuous color seems to flow into you.  You are 
immersed.  Instants later, the bond breaks, as your attention shifts to a nearby 
conversation. 
 
What a viewer is experiencing in such moments of immersion is a shift in the 
ordinary sense of one’s bodily boundaries.  For an instant, viewer and art work 
seem to merge.   
 
 Touching Art:








This paper introduces the hypothesis that viewers can use their 
somatosensory system to change the felt-sense of bodily boundary in order to 
bring themselves into intimate relationships with art objects.  They experience 
this imaginary fusion when simultaneously attending to their own somatosensory 
sensations, which occur inside the body, and to qualities of the art work, which 
exist in the external world.  At such moments viewers reinterpret their 
somatosensory sensations as a quality of the art work.  When inside and outside 
are reinterpreted, viewers cross the conventional boundary between self and 
object.  I characterize this as a somatosensory reinterpretation.  It is a tacitly 
held, performance knowledge that evolves over our lifetimes and serves the 
positive function of enhancing our experience of the artwork.  Somatic 
reinterpretation is a powerful phenomenon because the body is so intimately 
linked with our sense of identify and ego boundary that altering our sense of the 
body, although imaginative and temporary, involves changing what, in some 
theories, defines the self.1  In this brief exposition, I try first to make vivid the 
different kinds of experiences that can be created by somatosensory 
reinterpretation and then go on to examine the means by which they occur. 
First, I should identify what I mean by the somatosensory system.   When 
we say we have a certain gut feeling, we are referring to a component of the 
somatosensory system, specifically, the visceral functions, those involving the 
regulation of muscles in the heart and lungs, the intestines, the blood vessels, 
the stomach, and the skin.  The system also includes tactile sensations on the 
body’s surface, and, from deeper inside, our proprioceptive sensations, those 
detecting vibration and spatial position, as well as the kinesthetic senses of 
bodily movement and balance.  Although the somatic sensation of temperature is 
also pertinent to this study, pain sensations are less so. 
 
The Experience 
The experience of losing one’s bodily boundaries and uniting with 
something outside the self is not limited to our encounters with visual art.   Other 
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art forms create similar effects, which are expressed in ordinary language.  
Phrases like being filled with music and absorbed in a story speak to a shift in the 
ordinary extension of the body.  The writer Virginia Woolf describes it vividly 
when writing of Mrs. Ramsey gazing at the lighthouse: 
 
Often she found herself sitting and looking, sitting and looking, with 
her work in her hands until she became the thing she looked at--
that light, for example.   
  . . . . 
She saw the light again.  With some irony in her interrogation, for 
when one woke at all, one's relations changed, she looked at the 
steady light, the pitiless, the remorseless, which was so much her, 
yet so little her, which had her at its beck and call (she woke in the 
night and saw it bent across their bed, stroking the floor), but for all 
that she thought, watching it with fascination, hypnotized, as if it 
were stroking with its silver fingers some sealed vessel in her brain 
whose bursting would flood her with delight.  (To the Lighthouse,  
p. 97 and pp. 99-10, italics added) 
 
In this first passage Woolf identifies a projection--the sense of moving out of the 
body to meet the world, to become “the thing she looked at” and in the second-- 
an introjection--the experience of the thing entering one’s own body: the light’s 
“stroking with its silver fingers some sealed vessel in her brain.”   
These boundary shifts can also be observed first-hand. When speaking to 
audiences on this topic, I begin by introducing the notion of bodily intimacy with 
art objects, which primes the audience to respond to bodily feelings.  Several 
slides are then projected on a large screen.  With each slide I instruct the 
audience to perform a different task.  The first, Paul Strand's, Leaves, 1929, is a 
close-up photograph of long, blade-like, striped leaves oriented vertically.  I 
instruct the audience to let  their eyes slide up and down the leaves.  After a few 
seconds, I ask them to feel a corresponding line moving through their bodies.  
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Some individuals reported that they first thought the instruction was impossible to 
perform but tried and found, to their surprise, that they produced the line.  Were 
the viewer’s experiences further developed, the line within the viewer's body 
might be felt to have a thickness to it, a palpability.  This palpability would consist 
of the background feeling of the somatosensory system.   
Our somatosensory experiences can include more than a sense of linear 
movement.  For example, there might be a focal point on a canvas or sculpture 
that can serve as a connection from the eye to the body.  One might gaze intently 
at a color and feel it enter the body, as described in Rilke’s reflections on 
Cezanne’s Portrait of Madame Cezanne:    
In my feeling, the consciousness of their presence has become a 
heightening which I can feel even in my sleep; my blood describes 
it within me, but the naming of it passes by somewhere outside and 
is not called in.  Did I write about it?--A red, upholstered low 
armchair has been placed in front of an earthy-green wall in which 
a cobalt-blue pattern (a cross with the center left out +) is very 
sparingly repeated (1985,  p.79). 
Note, the color/thing has become associated with Rilke’s fluid, bodily interior.  
Even in sleep, when unconscious, the bond holds firm: The sleeper/dreamer 
experiences his own bodily heat, pulsations, respiration—a sense of heightening-
- as the thing itself.   
Another experience of reinterpretation is provided by Edvard Munch's 
lithograph The Cry (1895).  I instruct the audience to let their eyes slide 
rhythmically around on the lines and to become conscious of their own breathing.    
Standing before the same lithograph in a Munch exhibition at Boston College, I 
brought this question to a viewer willing to share his responses: 
Q: Can you make this work connect to your own breathing? 
A: Oh sure. . . . breathing out takes those figures in the background 
away from me and breathing in brings them towards me.  (Personal 
Interview, February 7, 2001). 
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One's lungs expanding and contracting, one’s heart beating, and one’s 
pulse throbbing might all be experienced in the dual capacity as subjective, as 
belonging to the self, or objective, when ascribed to the external.  Munch’s 
figures on the page might be drawn into one’s own body--one might say sucked 
in, or they might exercise their will on the observer, drawing him into their 
immensity.  Such feelings would be in keeping with Munch’s own experiences of 
being forcefully and palpability gripped by his own paintings. 
The spectator’s breath can serve both as a means of changing one’s 
psychological distance to the external object, by inhaling and exhaling, and of 
changing the nature of the self and the object.  The use of breath can be a highly 
charged somatic reinterpretation because of its strong emotional and cognitive 
associations.  In many contexts the intake and release of air is thought to have a 
transformative quality.  The ancient Hebrews used the same word for both spirit 
and wind, the Navajos linked the notions of awareness and air, and the 
Buddhists conceived of the Chi as an interior, spiritual breath (Abram, 1996).  
Furthermore, psychodynamic theories like Bioenergetics and the Feldenkrais 




My proposed model of somatosensory reinterpretation is grounded in the 
somatic marker hypothesis of Antonio Damasio.  According to Damasio, we have 
an ongoing awareness of the somatosensory system—the feeling of chemical 
changes, movements, contractions and expansions. 2  Noting that the brain 
continually receives feedback signals from the body’s autonomic processes, 
Damasio argues that this feedback provides us with a constant background 
awareness of our body’s somatosensory system: “The background body sense is 
continuous, although one may hardly notice it, since it represents not a specific 
part of anything in the body but rather an overall state of most everything in it,” 
(Descartes Error, 1994, p.152).  In recent writings Damasio refers to this as 
background state as  background emotion, the term I will use. 
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Damasio explains that when we experience a situation positively or 
negatively, we store memory images of this experience, which are associated 
with the negatively or positively felt bodily state that occurred with the 
experience.  When we reexperience these images, in perception or memory, we 
also reexperience the positive or negative bodily states that mark these images.  
He calls the latter somatic markers.  For example, suppose you once had bad 
luck in the stock market and are now thinking about making a high risk 
investment.  The past experiences—the tactile image of dialing the broker’s 
telephone, the auditory image of the words “let’s buy,”  the visual image of a 
graph with falling prices—are stored as multi-sensory images that are associated 
with, or marked by specific, negatively evaluated bodily states.  When posed with 
this new financial opportunity, you might have an unpleasant feeling, which 
causes you to proceed with caution.  This unpleasant feeling, a so-called gut 
feeling, is a negatively felt bodily state that marks images of risky investment and 
helps guide your future action.3   
My hypothesis of somatosensory reinterpretation grows out of Damasio’s 
theory of somatic markers.  I begin by accepting his assertion that the 
somatosensory system provides us with the feeling of a background emotion that 
is available to consciousness and that we correlate our bodily state with events in 
the world, which are perceived and remembered as images.   At this point, we 
begin to track different events.  In Damasio’s hypothesis, when a positive or 
negative somatosensory state marks an image, the somatic marker remains 
extrinsic to the image.  The body is associated with the graph of a stock crash 
but the body does not become it.  By contrast, with somatosensory 
reinterpretation, I hypothesize that a somatosensory state marks an image in 
such a way that it imaginatively becomes it—or part of it.4  You could say that the 
somatosensory system is being renamed, labeled, ascribed, which are all terms 
used in psychology or poetics to identify how one thing acquires the properties of 
another. 5  This is somewhat the way metaphors function, insofar as one term is 
redefined or focused through another term.  
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Converging Support: Merleau-Ponty 
Although the somatosensory hypothesis remains speculative, several 
converging theories offer support.  The first concerns the polarities of different 
sensory systems, a topic central to the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.6  The 
polarities of the sensory systems refer to the origin of the information that is 
conveyed by the senses—whether the information refers to the subjective pole of 
the self or the objective pole of the external world.  Vision is not usually 
considered a bipolar sense.  Oriented to the external world, vision gives us 
information about objects outside the body—a tree, a cup.   Conversely, touch is 
bipolar.  By touching, one can acquire information about an external object—the 
feel of the thing in the world.   Moreover, touch is also oriented to the subjective 
polarity, for one can acquire information about an internal object—the subjective 
feeling of being touched.  Visceral functions and other somatosensory states, 
which are not bipolar, give us information only about the inner world.   
The systems of touch and vision work together in infants but they 
gradually become separated into distinctive channels during maturation.   
However, a close relationship remains.  For this reason I suggest that when we 
want to touch something in the external world but cannot, touch can “fulfill” its 
ability to give information from the object world by acquiring the external object 
that properly belongs to vision.  We can then imaginatively touch the visually-
acquired object.  But this same experience of touch can also orient itself to the 
subjective pole, and it can give the sensation of being touched by the object of 
vision.  In this case the thing that does the (mental) touching is the external 
object of vision.  The combination of these two polarities bridges the physical 
distance between the visually perceived object and the viewer, bringing the 
palpability of the object seen into the subjective, bodily boundaries of the subject.   
Merleau-Ponty applies these polarities to visual art.7  Touch and vision 
blend together, such that “There is even an inscription of the touching in the 
visible, of the seeing in the tangible” (Visible and the Invisible, p.143).  In viewing 
paintings, then, the sense of self associated with the eye that touches the 
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painting becomes part of the painting as an object, and qualities of the painting 
become incorporated into the self—self as constituted by a seeing/touching eye.  
I suggest that these changes in bodily boundaries can be experienced 
throughout the entire somatosensory system, not just its touch component, the 
sense that Merleau-Ponty favors.   When visually engaged with the object, the 
background feel of the somatosensory system can be reinterpreted as the feel of 
certain qualities of the object viewed.  Indeed, these sensations can be 
interpreted to feel like the very substance of the object—its weight, density, or 
movement, in which case our somatosensory system is being projected onto the 
object in the world.  Our somatosensory system can also be interpreted as being 
touched by the object viewed—in which case the object is being introjected into 
one’s body.  Whatever the location, subjective or objective, the experience 
retains both components.   
In contrast to Merleau-Ponty’s theory, the reinterpetation hypothesis does 
not presume that human beings have an innate synesthesia that learning has 
obscured.  What creates the somatosensory reinterpretation is the desire of the 
subject to approach the object—a desire that is not experienced as a physical 
movement towards the object but as an interest, a curiosity to learn or 
experience more.  This desire is what motivates the reinterpretation.   
 
Converging Support: Sensori-motor theories  
To better understand how  desire facilitates somatic reinterpetation, I turn 
to sensori-motor theories of perception.  Such a theory posits a deep connection 
between movement and perception: “Perception is simulated action”  (Berthoz, p. 
10).  Differing in terms of where the origin of the motor intention is located--
whether in a central or a peripheral source, all versions of sensori-motor theory 
hold that the notion of five, independent senses is misleading.  Sensory 
perception does not occur without the use of motor images, which are schemas 
of motor activity stored in memory and deployed in connection with the various 
senses to achieve specific goals.  Jeannerod argues that such motor images can 
become conscious under circumstances where one’s unconscious preparations 
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to perform a motor action are frustrated (190).  I suggest that the viewing of art 
creates just this situation.   When prohibited from touching the art work,  a 
spectator might nonetheless engage in a kind of imaginative play with an object 
that constitutes a form of motor preparation, though it never results in action. The 
very lack of action would bring this motor preparation to awareness as a motor 
image, which might be reinterpreted.   
 
Converging Support: Psychoanalysis 
Freudian theory contains a number of concepts that bear a close 
relationship to the proposed notion of bodily reinterpretation. Notably, there is the 
condition known as hysteria, a situation in which a person suffers a bodily 
affliction, such as blindness, paralysis, or memory loss that does not appear to 
have an organic cause.   In treating such patients, Freud concluded that the 
disabilities were produced by conflicts within the mind involving the unconscious 
and that the bodily affliction was a symptom of an underlying problem that was 
psychological.  Thus, with hysteria the somatic body becomes marked as a sign 
of a conflict existing in another domain.  In the case of somatic reinterpretation, 
the body is also marked as a sign of something outside of itself.  However, in this 
case  the marked body is felt to become the specific thing that is represented, not 
only to  mark it indexically, as with hysteria.   
Also related to the reinterpretation hypothesis are the key psychoanalytic 
notions of projection and interjection.  According to psychoanalysis, projection 
occurs when one’s own wishes and feelings are ascribed to another person or 
object.  Analogously, introjection occurs when qualities of external objects are 
ascribed to the self.  Whereas the psychoanalytic notion of projection and 
introjection concern feelings and wishes, according to the reinterpretation 
hypothesis, the spectator engages in these boundary-altering strategies with 
regard to a different range of object and self properties and with different 
motivations.  The reinterpreting spectator exercises more volitional control over 
the transfers than in cases where projection and introjection are 
psychoanalytically applied.  In both theories, however, the subject ascribes 
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aspects of the self or the non-self to the other entity, thus shifting the boundaries 
of the self.  
 
Converging Support:  Linguistics and Metaphor Theory  [excerpt ] 
Various linguistic theories utilize the notion of projection, and in these cases what 
is projected is related explicitly to bodily systems (Johnson, 1987, and Lakoff, 
1987, Fauconnier and Turner, 2002).  Language, which offers numerous 
metaphors of boundary change, is said is build upon image schemas of the body, 
a foundational set of bodily metaphors that orient us in time and space.    
 
Converging Support: Cognitive Psychology  [excerpt] 
Within the discipline of cognitive psychology the theory that contains the 
most closely related concept of reinterpreting somatosensory states is attribution 
theory (Schachter and Singer, 1962) . . . . 
Although their findings have been challenged, their conclusion that 
emotion is produced by one’s interpretation of what is happening in any specific, 
social situation—one’s attribution, along with a general state of bodily arousal, 
remains a dominant model in psychology.  What attribution theory has in 
common with somatic reinterpretation is that both involve an interpretive 
operation that we impose upon our own bodily sensations.  With attribution 
theory, however, what one imposes is not a quality of an external object but a 
feeling state, an emotion, and thus the interpretation does not serve the function 
of changing our bodily boundaries.   
 
Converging Concepts: Phantom Limbs  [optional/extra] 
The final analogy is perhaps the most interesting in its power to advance 
the theory of somatic reinterpretation, though the research is speculative in its 
original context.  Exploring the phenomenon of phantom limbs, in which a subject 
feels sensations in a body part that is no longer attached to the body, V. S. 
Ramachandran and William Hirstein induce phantom limb type experience  in 
those with intact bodies.   For instance, they report creating contexts in which a 
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subject feels as if his nose has been displaced to a different location.  This 
illusion is created by an experimenter taking the left index finger of the subject 
and tapping it on the face of another person, who is sitting next to the subject, 
looking in the same direction.  The experimenter then taps the subject’s nose in 
exactly the same pattern as that being used with the subject’s left finger.  They 
note that 12 out of 18 subjects reported that their nose felt dislocated. 
Their explanation for this sense of displacement is that we take the 
similarity of patterned tapping on the nose and on the finger not to be 
coincidental.  Thus, we unify the two taps under one category, in accord with 
what they describe as Bayesian logic (“Three Laws of Qualia,” p.452-3).  
Concerning a related demonstration having to do with a subject gazing in a mirror 
at a dummy’s face, the experimenters write: “The subject comes to experience 
the dummy’s head as being his own to such an extent that it is now hooked up to 
his own limbic system and autonomic output” (“Three Laws of Qualia,” p.453). 
The most striking demonstration of this occurs in an experiment in which 
Ramachandran and Hirstein had subjects rhythmically stroke chairs and 
tabletops while they were having their own hand stroked in the same rhythm.  
Although the subject is stroking inanimate objects, she feels that the sensation of 
his or her hand emanates from these objects.  The researchers explain: 
You will start experiencing taps and strokes as emerging from the 
table surface even though your conscious mind knows perfectly 
well that this is logically absurd.  Again, the sheer statistical 
improbability of the two sequences of taps and strokes—one seen 
on the table surface an one felt on your hand—lead the brain to 
conclude that the table is now part of your body. (Phantoms in the 
Brain, 1998, p.60). 
From the evidence that you “can actually project your sensations to 
external objects” (“Three Laws of Qualia,” p.60), Ramachandran concludes that 
“your body image, despite all its appearance of durabilty, is an entirely transitory 
internal construct that can be profoundly modified with a few simple tricks” 
(Phantoms in the Brain, p.62).   
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The claim that the boundaries of our body image are malleable is 
consistent with views articulated by Paul Schilder (1950) and others.  Although 
the hypothesis of reinterpreting one’s somatosensory system does not seem to 
describe something as strikingly illusory as the feeling that one’s nose has been 
displaced, it does involve manipulating one’s sense of bodily boundaries so as to 
give the sense that one inhabits things in the world.  In this respect, 
Ramachandran and Hirstein’s demonstrations support the reinterpretation 
hypothesis. 
Their demonstration, however, need not be used only to reinforce the 
general claim that body images are malleable.  Concluding this section on a 
speculative note, I raise the possibility that the analysis of dual touches in the 
demonstration might be applicable also to the perception of visual art.  Just as 
Ramachandran and Hirstein’s subjects move their hands back and forth over a 
table top, so too, with the photo of Strand’s Leaves, the spectators move their 
eyes back and forth over the leaves.  In place of having an experimenter stroke 
the subject’s hand in a pattern that corresponds to what the subject is actually 
doing to the table, spectators of the artwork stroke themselves—imaginatively.  
They produce an imaginative, bodily stroking, which corresponds to what the 
spectator’s eyes are doing with the photograph.  Perhaps the coordination 
between a spectator’s rhythmic eye scanning and rhythmic, internal stroking 
changes the spectator’s bodily relationship to the art object.8 
 
Conclusion 
To explore more fully the issues raised in this paper it would be helpful to 
expand the limited and sometimes misleading descriptions of internal experience 
that are available in our language—a problem noted by William James (1918, 
p.194-5) and reiterated by others (Jeannerod, p.187).  This is accomplished not 
only by sharpening our introspective techniques and our analytical descriptions 
but also by broadening the questions posed for experimentation and humanistic 
study.  I note below several areas that I aim to develop this year: 
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Re:  Theory of spectatorship:   
Building on the work of scholars who are already attuned to these differing 
states of affective and cognitive engagement (Crary, Freedberg), I propose to 
investigate, through interviews and experiments, the performance knowledge of 
individual spectators that creates such alterations of bodily boundaries.  A form of 
cultural memory, an individual’s performance knowledge evolves over one’s 
lifetime, shaped by historical and biological factors that include one’s cognitive 
style, abilities, beliefs, and the immediate context of viewing. 
 
Re:  Empathy Theory:   
The hypothesis of somatic reinterpretation is also integral to constructing 
new models of artistic empathy and for rethinking traditional  notions of aesthetic 
experience and aesthetic pleasure.  Whereas empathy is generally deemed to be 
intrinsically valuable and often said to constitute the ultimate aim of the art object, 
especially if it gives aesthetic pleasure, the concept of somatic reinterpretation 
decouples these three components, permitting a more precise analysis of the 
issues.   
 
Re:  Art Scholarship:   
Moreover, somatosensory reinterpretation can influence interpretation  
Where a spectator somatically engages an object, she might discover aspects of 
her own bodily involvement with the art work that become thematically central to 
the interpretation of the work, to the artist’s creative process, and to the artist’s 
style.  It has been argued, for example, that the pictorial space of painters such 
as Cezanne, Courbet, and Miro provide metaphors for the bodily immersion of 
the painter into the painting’s surface (Shiff, Fried, Palermo).  This kind of 
pictorial space can be most readily discerned when a spectator enters it through 
her own somatosensory experience.  This is an interpretive practice that is 
sometimes undertaken by art historians but is under-theorized and under-utilized.  
I will argue that somatosensory reinterpretation provides a unique perspective for 
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knowing the art work, an epistemological claim relevant to the question as to 
whether knowledge of a work requires direct experience of its sensuous 
properties.   
 
 Re: Aesthetics:   
A final claim for somatosensory reinterpretation is for its role as a complement to 
historical and linguistically-based interpretations.  While not a substitute for them, 
I will argue that the spectator’s somatic reinterpretation and subsequent reflection 
on this immersion constitutes a valuable experience of art.  According to the 
phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard, the imagination is enriched when we deeply 
inhabit the image.   
 
Re:  Anthropology and Cultural History:   
Beyond these specific issues in art history, somatosensory reinterpretation 
might be useful to the more anthropologically-oriented question as to why 
humans find art objects so animate and powerful (Freedberg).  Whether we 
approach material objects as totems or fetishes, I will argue that their vitality can 
be created from our own breath and bodily feeling—functions of the 
somatosensory system.  Michael Taussig’s anthropological work on shamanistic 
mimesis and W.J.T. Mitchell’s work on totems offer rich material for study. 
The changes in our experience of the bodily perimeter that I characterize 
as somatosensory reinterpretation occur not only in the arts but in many facets of 
life—though not necessarily in the same contexts or with the same volitional 
control or for the same purposes.  Religious, therapeutic, erotic, and healing 
practices, as well as pathological conditions, can all involve the body as a site of 
fusion with objects and others in the world.   
 In short, the possibilities are rich for exploring the subtle ways that we 
move our embodied selves through the object world that envelops us. 
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1 The idea of projecting one’s self into an object--empathy--was explored in depth 
by a number of writers whose work is tied to the intellectual traditions of the 19th 
century.  The German Romantic poets provided general notions of merger with 
nature, and psychologists like Robert Vischer (1927) and Theodor Lipps (1897) 
further developed the idea under the name of empathy (Einfuhlung).  Though the 
bodily component become more specific in these aesthetic theories, their 
concepts reflect the dominant philosophical influences of their culture.  
 
2 Damasio also points out that full bodily circuits, body loops, need not be 
involved in our use of these markers.  The brain has the capacity to respond to a 
stimulus by creating the kind of brain state that would be configured were a 
message to have been received from the full body.  Called an as-if loop, this 
brain state permits quicker changes in our registration of different somatic 
markers than would be possible through use of the full body.  I suggest that the 
production of as-if loops might be particularly valuable in the experience of visual 
art, for it would permit rapid transitions between bodily states, which might 
thereby keep up in tempo with the reader’s moment to moment experience of the 
art work. 
 
3 Based on his work with brain-damaged patients who cannot feel the bodily 
state, Damasio hypothesizes that we use these somatic markers in the reasoning 
process.  As we can produce these bodily states more quickly than we can 
rationally calculate risks and benefits, they might help us in sorting various 
possibilities for action and calling to attention options that have potential benefits 
or drawbacks.  What we call intuition might be a reasoning process that uses 
these somatic markers. 
 
4 I say the reader “imaginatively” experiences this state because a real confusion 
between what is inside and outside of the body would generally be considered 
pathological.    This operation is more akin to a willing suspension of disbelief  
than a hallucination.  
  
5 In poetics the device of metaphor has been broadly used to characterize an 
exchange of properties between two terms.  Sometimes one term receive some 
of the qualities of the other, and in other cases both terms receive qualities from 
the other term—a case of mutual modification. 
 
6 Compared with the model of somatic reinterpretation, Merleau-Ponty’s concept 
of bodily engagement is both narrower, as he omits visceral processes, and 
broader in its analysis of viewing experiences, for it is not attentive to viewer 
differences based on gender, contexts, and specific qualities of artworks 
Speaking to the narrowness of Merleau-Ponty's bodily model, Drew Leder notes 
in The Absent Body, “The lived body he [Merleau-Ponty] describes is never 
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complete.  There is little discussion of metabolism, visceral processes, birth, and 
death” (Leder, 1990, p.36).  Whereas Leder goes on to investigate the way in 
which visceral processes are powerful but absent from awareness, “My corporeal 
depths disappear not only from perception but relative to my structure of will and 
action" (p.45), I explore how they become present to consciousness. 
 
7 Because the eye of the self sees objects and the bodily self is an   object, so 
too, objects see the self. This explains why, Merleau-Ponty notes, painters say 
that “things look at them” (Visible and the Invisible, p.167).   
 
8 If the changes in bodily boundaries are effected through some kind of 
internalized, rhythmic motions, it would be interesting to explore musical rhythms 
of viewing as a means of creating out-of-body states.  I refer to the intriguing 
work of William H. McNeill, Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human 
History and to Ellen Dissanayake’s provocative Art and Intimacy: How the Arts 
Began.  
 
